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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(j)
(1953 as amended).1
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This case is an appeal from afinalorder from the Third Judicial District Court of Summit
County, State of Utah, entered by the Honorable Pat B. Brian, originally on December 30, 1997
which order was subsequently substantially modified by Judge William B. Bohling on February
18, 1998. The Court granted plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and the subsequent award
of fees and costs signed March 10, 1998 by Judge Donald Nohring for Judge Bohling.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND
APPROPRIATE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
This appeal is from the Trial Court's grant of a motion of summary judgment to the
plaintiff/appellee. Each of the issues presented and their appropriate standards of review are set
forth below.
I.

Did the Court inappropriately award ownership of the condominium to Scott?
When reviewing a summary judgment, the party against whom the judgment is granted is

entitled to have all the facts presented, and all the inferences fairly arising therefrom, considered
in the light most favorable to them. Winegar v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991).
II.

Did the Court err in ruling on the motions for summary judgment when they had not been

submitted for decision?

hereafter all references to the Utah Code Annotated shall be to the 1953 code as amended
unless otherwise noted.
1

This issue is a matter of statutory construction, it is a question of law that requires no
deference to the District Court's interpretation. See Berube v. Fashion Centre. Ltd.. 771 P.2d
1033, 1038 (Utah 1989).
III.

Did the Trial Court err in awarding Scott set-off damages?
This is a question of law that requires no deference to the District Court's holding. See

Jensen v. Bountiful Citv. 20 Utah 2d 159, 435 P.2d 284 (1967).
IV.

Did the Trial Court err in awarding Scott damages under the doctrine of recoupment?
This is a question of law that requires no deference to the District Court's holding. See

Jensen v. Bountiful Citv. 20 Utah 2d 159, 435 P.2d 284 (1967).
V.

Did the Trial Court err in the amount that it awarded in damages, costs and attorneys fees?
The issues presented under this argument are mixed questions of law and fact. Appellate

courts give deference to the Trial Court's findings of fact, and will not set them aside unless they
find them clearly erroneous. Legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness and afforded no
deference. Mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed for a base of direction in applying the
law to the facts. Woodhausen Apartments v. Washington. 942 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 1997).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISION STATUTE AND RULES
The determinative statutes and rules in this case are reproduced herein as Addendum "B"
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case arises out of a contract entered into for the sale of a condominium located in Park
City, Utah.
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A disagreement arose between Ms. Majors, who was the owner of the condominium and
Mr. Scott who was the assignee of a Mr. Knapp who had entered into the real estate purchase
contract with Ms. Majors. Ms. Majors claimed that the agreement was void due to fraud and
refused to sell the condominium to Scott in accordance with the written terms of the contract. Mr.
Scott brought suit in the Third District Court for Summit County seeking specific performance of
the real estate purchase contract.
Mr. Scott filed a motion for summary judgement requesting the court grant him specific
performance against Ms. Majors. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment on
January 29, 1996.
Ms. Majors appealed the trial courts decision. In an unpublished decision dated April 10,
1997 the Utah Court of Appeals in case number 960536-CA denied Ms. Majors appeal finding that
even though Ms. Majors had set forth sufficient facts to show fraud in the inducement, her claim
failed because Ms. Majors could not have reasonably relied on the misrepresentations made by
Knapp.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Trial Court was affirmed. That judgment required Ms.
Majors to sell the property to Scott in accordance with the terms of the REPC. The parties dispute
what occurred next. Ms. Majors claims that she attempted to sell the property to Scott upon the
terms of the REPC, but that Scott, through his counsel, insisted on additional terms including a
mutual release of claims and the withholding of funds at closing to cover attorneys fees in the prior
law suit. Scott's counsel claims Majors would not sell the property in accordance with the terms
of the REPC.
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Scott's counsel filed a motion for summary judgment seeking an award of attorneys fees
and costs from the original law suit. The matter was scheduled for a hearing on July 14, 1997. On
July 10, 1997 Ms. Majors filed bankruptcy in the state of California.
Both Scott and his counsel were listed as debtors in the bankruptcy. On October 31, 1997
Ms. Majors received a discharge in bankruptcy. Thereafter Scott filed an amended memorandum
again requesting costs and fees entitled a motion for summary judgment. That matter was
originally scheduled for hearing in November of 1997, but the hearing was delayed until early
December 1997. At that time Scott also filed a Motion for Order Establishing Terms and
Conditions of Conveyance of Real Property. In the prayer for relief, this motion was also termed
a motion for summary judgment.
On December 30, 1997 the Court entered a judgment establishing Scott's right to offset the
contract purchase price against Scott's cost, damages and attorneys fees, and awarding the real
property to Scott.
Thereafter Scott filed another Motion for Order Establishing Terms and Conditions of
Conveyance of Real Property. The motion substantially modified the Order of December 30,
1997. That motion was granted by order dated February 17, 1998. On March 10, 1998 additional
fees and costs were granted. Subsequently this appeal was brought by Ms. Majors.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Linda Majors (hereafter "Ms. Majors") is a resident of the State of California. R.9

2.

Ms. Majors was the owner of a condominium known as Carriage House Condo #407

located in Park City, Utah. R.8
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3.

In September of 1994 Ms. Majors was contacted by a Mr. Gary Krall who offered to

purchase the condominium. R.393
4.

Ms. Majors declined. R.393

5.

In the next couple of months Ms. Majors business in California suffered some financial

setbacks. Accordingly, in November she decided to accept Mr. Krall's offer. R.136
6.

At that time, however, Ms. Majors could not recall Mr. Krall's name or phone number and

accordingly in December she contacted Lynne Richmond ("Richmond") who represented the
property management company that rented the condominium on Ms. Majors behalf. R.392
7.

It was Ms. Majors belief that Mr. Krall had previously been referred to her by Richmond.

8.

Richmond would not give Mr. Krall's name to Ms. Majors, instead she provided the name

of another prospective buyer, a Mr. Ed Knapp ("Knapp"). R.392
9.

Ms. Majors later discovered that Richmond did not have a contract to manage Mr. Krall's

condominiums while she did have such an agreement with Knapp. R.392
10.

Knapp also was a resident of California and a real estate agent or broker. R. 135

11.

Knapp approached Ms. Majors at her shop in California. R.153

12.

Knapp represented to Ms. Majors that he would purchase the condominium for $37,500

and that payment would be made within 48 hours. R.41
13.

During this visit Knapp contacted Park City Title Company, which he represented to Ms.

Majors handled all of his closings, and had them fax him a Utah Real Estate Purchase Contract
(REPC).
14.

Knapp filled out the REPC. R. 136

15.

Ms. Majors signed the document without reading it thoroughly. R.135
5

16.

Knapp did not provide payment within 48 hours as promised. R. 134

17.

That condition was not listed in the signed REPC. R.66

18.

In January of 1995 Knapp phoned Ms. Majors and informed her that he and a gentleman

named Steve Scott ("Scott") were in Park City to raise money for the condominium.
19.

Ms. Majors informed Knapp that she was not willing to sell at the previous cash price as

the payment had not been made within 48 hours as promised. R.74
20.

Park City Title Company faxed Ms. Majors a letter informing her that she had to sell the

condominium at the previously agreed upon price. R.72
21.

Upon advise from some attorneys she had contacted, Ms. Majors informed everyone that

she was not willing to go through with the sale of the condominium based on the misrepresentation
that had been made with respect to the 48 hour purchase. R.70
22.

In February of 1995 Ms. Majors received a letter from Mary Ann Hansen identifying

herself as Mr. Scott's attorney. R.70
23.

Ms. Hansen demanded Ms. Majors sell the condominium at the $37,500 price and

furthermore that she pay $20,000 in damages to Mr. Scott or that she would file a Lis Pendens
preventing Ms. Majors from selling the property. R.70
24.

Ms. Majors refused to accede to Scott's demands and in February of 1995 Hansen filed a

Lis Pendens. R.40
25.

This was filed even though no lawsuit had been filed in violation of statute. R.40

26.

In April of 1995 Hansen filed a complaint on Scott's behalf against Ms. Majors alleging

breach of contract. R.9
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27.

Attached to the complaint was a copy of the Utah REPC which Ms. Majors had signed.

Unlike the copy that Ms. Majors had, the copy attached to the complaint had been signed by Scott
and the date line was left blank. R.3-4
28.

In July of 1995 Ms. Majors retained John Musselman to represent her in the civil action.

R.37
29.

At the time Ms. Majors retained Mr. Musselman she was not aware that he had previously

had his license suspended three times.
30.

Musselman filed an answer and counterclaim. R.48

31.

Scott filed a motion for summary judgment. R.57

32.

No responsive was filed in opposition by Musselman. See Index

33.

The REPC attached to the memorandum in support differed from the one in the Complaint

and that it was now dated as well as signed by Scott. R. at 96 R. at 2.
34.

After oral argument the Court ruled in favor of Scott and ordered the condominium sold

to him under the Doctrine of Specific Performance. R.130
35.

Ms. Majors retained new counsel and filed an appeal of the Trial Courts decision. R. 138

36.

In the decision rendered in April of 1997 the Utah Court of Appeals found that while there

existed issues of material fact as to whether or not Ms. Majors was mislead into signing the
REPC, her failure to read the REPC meant that she had not reasonably relied upon the
misrepresentations that had been made and accordingly she was ordered to sell the condominium
to Scott under the terms of the REPC. R. 168-169
37.

At the time of the Court's original order the issue of costs and attorneys fees had been

taken under advisement and no ruling had been made. R. 168-169
7

38.

After the Court's decision, Ms. Majors contacted Susan Johnson an escrow officer with

Associated Title Company and asked her to handle the sale of the condominium to Scott. R.376
39.

In May of 1996 Ms. Majors received a phone call from Susan Johnson who advised Ms.

Majors that Scott would not purchase the property under the terms of the REPC. R.376
40.

Scott was insisting on a mutual release together with the payment of Hansen's attorneys

fees from the proceeds of the sale. R.398
41.

Ms. Majors then contacted a real estate attorney in California named Wacy Armstrong, Jr.,

to handle negotiations with Hansen. Hansen faxed a mutual release agreement to Armstrong
demanding Ms. Majors sign the same within 24 hours. Ms. Majors refused. R.398
42.

Scott filed a motion seeking attorneys fees and costs from the Court. R. 180

43.

The matter was scheduled for a hearing on July 14, 1997. R. 173

44.

On July 10, 1997 Ms. Majors filed bankruptcy in California. R.357

45.

Scott and Hansen were listed as creditors in the bankruptcy. R.358

46.

The condominium was abandoned by the bankruptcy trustee. R.409

47.

Scott and Hansen were discharged in the bankruptcy. R.356

48.

In November of 1997 Scott filed a motion seeking an order from the Court awarding "set-

off' damages to be taken from the proceeds otherwise due for the purchase of the condominium
and ordering Associated Title to execute the transfer documents even if Majors refused to do so.
R.269-R.32Q
49.

Ms. Majors and Armstrong sent letters to the Court requesting an extension of time for Ms.

Majors to obtain Utah counsel and to resist this issue. In the interim Ms. Majors sent copies of the
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documents from the bankruptcy court showing the claims for damages by Hansen and Scott had
been discharged in the bankruptcy. R.320, R.356, R.359-R.372
50.

The Trial Court extended the hearing until the first part of December. R.373

51.

Ms. Majors was unable to retain counsel by that time and did not have the funds to travel

to Utah herself. R.409
52.

The Court held the hearing and took the matter under advisement. R. 465

53.

In December of 1997 Ms. Majors filed a civil complaint in the State of California against

Ed Knapp based upon his misrepresentations. R.510
54.

On the basis of that law suit a Lis Pendens was filed with respect to the condominium in

the State of Utah. R.510
55.

On December 30, 1997 Judge Bryan entered an order granting Scott's motion for set-off

and ordering Associated Title to execute the necessary documents to transfer the property. R.467470
56.

In February of 1998 a hearing was scheduled on Scott's motion to release the Lis Pendens

that had been filed against the property. R.477
57.

Ms. Majors had contacted and retained Dana Facemeyer for the purposes of that hearing.

58.

At that hearing the Court released the Lis Pendens without notice of pendency of the

motion that modified the prior order of December 1997. R.515
59.

After the hearing Ms. Hansen took the order to the Olympia Hotel and had Lynn Richmond

change the locks to the condominium.
60.

Since that time Ms. Majors had been denied access to the property and has further been

denied the opportunity to recover her personal property.
9

61.

On March 10, 1998 Judge Donald Nehring signed an order granting additional fees and

costs.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This case comes before the Court on an appeal from an award of summary judgment
awarding ownership of a condominium in Park City, Utah together with costs, fees, and damages
to the Plaintiff Scott.
In reviewing a Motion for Summary Judgment all facts and reasonable inferences therefrom
are drawn in the favor of the party opposing the motion. The facts as set forth by Ms. Majors
demonstrate that the original purchase contract was obtained through fraud and misrepresentation.
When Ms. Majors refused to go through with the sale, Scott brought the initial action in the
District Court to force specific performance.
The Trial Court found that the contract itself was plain and ambiguous and was unwilling
to allow parol evidence which Ms. Majors attempted to introduce to demonstrate that the contract
was procured through fraud.
On appeal the Utah Court of Appeals held that while there were issues of material fact with
respect to how the contract was obtained, the fact that the contract was short and concise and that
Ms. Majors had failed to read the contract thoroughly at the time she signed it meant that any
reliance on the misrepresentations was unreasonable. Since reasonable reliance is a criterion for
finding fraud, the Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's original ruling and remanded the
case.
The Trial Court's original order had ordered Ms. Majors to comply with the terms of the
real estate purchase contract. Ms. Majors claims that she attempted to close as per the REPC, but
10

that Scott by and through his counsel refused to close the transaction unless Ms. Majors agreed
to a mutual release together with allowing a set off for attorneys fees and cost against the sales
proceeds. There had not at that time been an actual order setting the amount of costs and attorneys
fees as that issue had been taken under advisement by the Court at the time it entered its original
judgment.
Scott filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking his attorneys fees, costs and damages.
That motion was scheduled for hearing on July 14, 1997. On July 10, 1997 Ms. Majors filed
bankruptcy in the State of California. In the bankruptcy proceeding the bankruptcy trustee
abandoned the condominium back to Ms. Majors. Ms. Majors received a discharge in bankruptcy
on November 20, 1997.
After receiving notice of the discharge, Scott filed an amended pleading seeking attorneys
fees, costs and damages. Scott then filed a additional pleading requesting the court order
Associated Title Company to execute the documents necessary to transfer the ownership of the
condominium to Scott if Ms. Majors was unwilling to do so. No notice to submit for decision was
submitted with this decision.
The Court held a hearing the first week of December to consider Scott's motions. Ms.
Majors was not present and was not represented by counsel. The Court took the matter under
advisement and on December 30, 1997 awarded Scott his fees, costs and damages. The award was
made purportedly under the provisions of the bankruptcy code allowing set off and also under the
Doctrine of Recoupment.
The Doctrine of Set off was raised directly by Scott in his initial brief but the Doctrine of
Recoupment was not raised until he had filed his reply brief.
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A review of relevant case law shows that neither the Doctrine of Set off nor Recoupment
could have or should have been applied against the debt owing to Ms. Majors in this case. Those
doctrines are only available against the trustee in bankruptcy and not against the debtor herself.
Pursuant to Federal Bankruptcy law therefore no award of costs or fees could be made to
the Plaintiff and indeed the Plaintiff was precluded from additional court efforts to obtain those
fees and costs, which resulted in additional fees and costs which were awarded by the Court.
The Court never appears to have addressed the issue of Ms. Majors compliance with the
prior Court's order which obligated her to fulfill her duties under the terms of the REPC. The
Plaintiff failed to address those points by sworn testimony, Ms. Majors is therefore allowed to rely
on her pleadings which specifically claimed that she had tried to fulfill her obligations but that
Scott had insisted on a mutual release and a set off of fees before he would close. This demand for
set off was even before any fees had been awarded. Construing the facts of this case in the way
most favorable to Ms. Majors establishes that she had fully complied with the prior Court's order
which had been upheld by the Court of Appeals. Accordingly the demands by Scott for additional
conditions and terms not included in the REPC resulted either in a material breach of the contract
or a counteroffer which was rejected by Ms. Majors thereby voiding the contract. Since Ms.
Majors had no duty thereafter to sell the condominium to Scott the Court's awarding of the
condominium ot Scott is plain err.
Even if the Court correctly awarded the property to Scott, the amount of attorneys fees,
costs and damages is incorrect as a matter of law. The costs include costs that are not directly
pertaining to this law suit. In the statement of costs it specifically states that they are costs incurred
after December 30, 1997. They included service of process in California, a filing fee to attack a
12

lis pendens, and overnight mailing fees. The overnight mailing fees are not allowable costs in and
of themselves. The other costs relate to the action taking place in the State of California. If Scott
wants to recover fees in that case he must prevail in that court and receive an award in that court.
He cannot piggyback his demands for attorneys fees and costs in this case with actions he is taking
in another forum in a completely different matter.
In addition Scott has receive damages to which he is not entitled. For example, the Court
had property taxes for the year 1997 paid directly from funds that were to go to Ms. Majors. This
is in spite of the fact that part of the damages that Scott has claimed are rents for the entire year
of 1997. Clearly he cannot have both the rents and force Ms. Majors to pay the fees and costs
associated with the condominium. In addition Scott seeks to recover all of his costs incident with
the aborted purchase of the property. Clearly those costs would have had to have been incurred
had he purchased the property. If he is going to receive the property he cannot receive back the
money that he would have had to expend in order to purchase it. If he is able to do that he is
receiving a windfall and a double award.
Scott is not entitled to the property because the facts as plead by Ms. Majors shows that
she has complied with the Court's order and Scott breached the REPC relieving Ms. Majors of
the duty to transfer the property to him. Scott is not entitled to his damages, costs, and attorneys
fees because they have been discharged in bankruptcy. Scott would not be entitled to the requested
fees, costs and damages in any event as they are overstated, double counted and they are not
allowable.
Ms. Majors therefore respectfully request the Court remand this case to the trial court for
full consideration of the performance of the various parties with respect to the obligations imposed
13

upon them by the REPC, after the Court of Appeals decision, and for the Court to further direct
the Court as to the disallowance of all costs, fees and damages purportedly incurred.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT IMPROPERLY AWARDED OWNERSHIP OF THE CONDOMINIUM
TO SCOTT.
This matter came before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment. In reviewing

Scott's request for summary judgment the court was obligated to accept the facts plead by the
defendant, the party opposing the motion for summary judgement, and all inferences therefrom
in the way that is most favorable to Ms. Majors. Bihlmaier v. Carlson. 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979).
Unfortunately the Court appears to have begun its consideration of this matter at the point
of transferring the property to Scott. There was no order that the property be surrendered to Scott,
the only order, in the judgement and order that was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, was that
Ms. Majors comply with the terms of the REPC. According to the facts as pled by Ms. Majors,
she attempted to comply with the Court's order. She contacted Associated Title Company and
requested that they close the transaction in accordance with the REPC.
Scott, however, was not willing to close the deal on the terms of the REPC. Scott, by and
through his counsel, insisted on a mutual release and upon payment of what Scott deemed to be
his damages and fees. Neither of those two items were required by the REPC.
When Ms. Majors refused to accede to these additional demands, Scott refused to purchase
the property. Instead, Scott proceeded to attempt to obtain a judgment for attorneys fees and costs
and later to get the Court to simply hand the property over to him directly.
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Scott's insistence that Majors escrow money to provide a set-off for any claims that he had
and to provide a mutual release of claims between the parties before he would close constitute
either a breach of the REPC or in the alternative constitute a counteroffer which Ms. Majors
declined. In either case Ms. Majors was no longer under any obligation to sell the condominium
to Scott after he had failed to purchase it under the terms of the REPC.
Since Majors was no longer under obligation to sell the condominium, the Court's order
giving possession and purported ownership to Scott is in error and the Court's award of attorneys
fees and costs is in error as it was Scott who breached the agreement after the ruling of the Court
of Appeals and not Majors. Ms. Majors therefore respectfully requests this court reverse the
granting of summary judgment to the Plaintiff and restore the property to Ms. Majors pending the
resolution of the factual issues in the Trial Court below.
II.

THE MOTIONS WERE NOT RIPE FOR CONSIDERATION AND ACCORDINGLY
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING ON THE SAME.
The Utah Code of Judicial Administration requires a notice to submit for decision be filed

with the court before a motion can be considered for decision. Rule 4-501(d) states in pertinent
part: "If neither party files a notice the motion will not be submitted for decision."
Scott did not file a notice to submit for decision for his motion for attorneys fees and costs,
or for either of the two motions for summary judgment seeking the Courts order in transferring
the property.
Scott argues that he complied with the rule because he served a notice of hearing with his
motions. Nothing in the rules states that a notice of hearing can substitute for a notice to submit
for decision. The plain language of the Rule states that a notice to submit must be filed. Rules and
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statutes are to be interpreted according to their plain language. Gohler v. Wood. 919 P.2d 561,
562 (Utah 1996). Because the motion was not properly submitted for decision no decision should
have been rendered and the matter should be remanded.
III.

SCOTT'S CLAIMS FOR COSTS, ATTORNEYS FEES AND DAMAGES ARE
BARRED BY THE UNTIED STATES BANKRUPTCY CODE.
It is undisputed by the parties that Ms. Majors filed for bankruptcy on July 10, 1997. It

is undisputed by the parties that prior to thefilingof bankruptcy there had been no award of costs
or attorneys fees or other damages. It is also undenied that both Scott and his counsel were listed
as creditors in the bankruptcy and that Ms. Majors received a discharge in the bankruptcy. Scott
claims, however, that he is entitled to a set-off for costs, fees, and damages pursuant to 11 USC
§ 553. In the case of In re IML Freight. Inc. 65 B.R. 788, (Bankr. D. Utah 1986), the Court set
forth a discussion of the application of Section 553 and set-off in general. The Court stated:
Set-off is the right that exists between two parties to net their respective debts where each
party, as a result of unrelated transactions owes the other an ascertained amount. In any
action brought for the larger debt, only the balance would be recoverable . . . Although
the principal of set-off is not complicated its application in the bankruptcy context has been
the source of much litigation. Section 553 provides that bankruptcy "does not effect the
right of the creditor to off-set a mutual debt owing by such creditor to the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case . . . against the claim of such creditor against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case . . . " Section 553 essentially
preserves, with some changes, the right of set off in bankruptcy cases found in former
Section 60 under the Bankruptcy Act. Generally speaking, a creditor may set off a mutual
debt owed by the Creditor to the Debtor against a claim by the creditor against the debtor,
where the claim and the debt both arose before the commencement of the case . . . the
statute contains several exceptions and limitations. First, the debt to be set-off must be
allowable. Second, the claim to be set off may not have been transferred to the creditor
after 90 days before filing while the debtor was insolvent. Third, the claim may not be one
incurred during the 90-day period before filing while the debtor was insolvent for the
purpose of retaining the right of set off.
In re IML Freight. Inc. at 791.
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The claims for fees, damages, and costs made by Scott in this case violate all or in part the
first and third restrictions placed on set-off by 11 USC Section 553(a)(1).
A,

The Debt To Be Set-off Is Not Allowable.

The first and most important violation of the right of set off is that the debt to be set off
must be allowable. As chief support for his right of set-off Scott cites the case of In re Davidovic.
901 F.2d 1533 (10th Cir. 1990). This case, however, does not support Scott's position at all. At
page 1539 in footnote 4 the 10th Circuit clearly states that while it is willing to recognize the
applicability of set-off in claims against the estate of the debtor in the bankruptcy context it was
not holding that such a claim for set off could be made directly against the debtor outside the
bankruptcy proceedings.
In that footnote the Court specifically cites to the case of In re Johnson, 13 B.R. 185
(Bankr. M.D. of Tenn 1981). In In re Johnson the Court held:
The set-off provisions of Section 533(a), like its predecessor in the old act, permit a
creditor to off-set a prepetition debt owed the debtor against a claim against the bankruptcy
estate. They do not allow a prepetition creditor to off-set a claim against the debtor that has
been discharged against a post petition liability to the debtor, regardless of whether the
cause of action may have arisen prior to the bankruptcy.
In re Johnson at 189.

The Johnson Court decision is firmly based in the actual language of the code. 11 USC §
524(a)(2) states in pertinent part:
(a)
a discharge in a case under this title - . . . . (2) operates as an injunction against
the commencement or continuation of any action, the employment of process, or any act
to collect, recover, or offset any such debt [discharged under Section 727, 944, 1141, or
1348 of this title] as a personal liability of the debtor, or from property of the debtor,
whether or not discharge of such debt is waived; . . . .
(emphasis added)
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The code by its plain language does not permit an off-set to be made against the debtor or
the debtor's property outside or after the bankruptcy. That is exactly what Scott is seeking here.
The property was abandoned back to Ms. Majors by the trustee. The rights to the cash
from the sale of the property likewise go to Ms. Majors. Because the claims for fees and costs and
damages were discharged by the bankruptcy court Scott has no right nor ability to pursue those
claims in any fashion at this point.
The Trial Court's award of these costs and damages to Scott is clearly against the statute
and it must therefore be reversed.
B.

Scott Has Been Allowed To Set-off Costs And Fees Incurred Within the 90-Day
Period.

Under Section 553 no set-off is allowed when the debt is incurred within 90-days prior to
filing of bankruptcy action. It is undisputed that the bankruptcy action was filed on July 10, 1997.
Notwithstanding that restriction, the affidavit of attorneys fees submitted on November 17,1997
to the Third District Court contains fees incurred during the 90-day period and during the period
of automatic stay. See R. 344 to 353. No charges after April 10, 1997 would be allowable.
According to the affidavit of fees and costs this totals $8,797. In addition to that Scott is
attempting to recover $2,000 in fees paid to a California bankruptcy attorney. All of those fees
were incurred during the period of the automatic stay.
Because the debt sought was purportedly incurred within the 90-days of the bankruptcy all
fees and costs incurred after April 10, 1997 and prior to November 20, 1997 must be disallowed.
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IV.

SCOTT IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER THE REQUESTED FEES, COSTS
AND DAMAGES UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF RECOUPMENT.
Scott claims that the Doctrine of Recoupment is different from that of set-off, and creates

a separate basis on which he should be entitled to recover his fees, costs, and damages in this case.
In spite of that fact, the argument was not raised until Scott's reply brief in support of his motion
for summary judgment. Clearly the recoupment argument was not a "reply" to the argument raised
by Ms. Majors in her opposition to the motion for summary judgment. It represented instead a
completely separate argument which should have been raised in the initial memorandum if it was
to be considered by the court at all.
The Rules of Judicial Administration and Civil Procedure do not provide for any briefing
beyond the reply brief of the party requesting summary judgment. It is not fair to allow totally new
claims to be raised in such a pleading. Accordingly, the Trial Court should not have even
considered the Doctrine of Recoupment as a basis of recovery by Scott.
Nevertheless, the Trial Court clearly did examine the recoupment issue. Like the Court's
ruling on set-off the Court's ruling on recoupment is in error. The primary difference between
recoupment and set-off is that set-off is a doctrine particularly prescribed by the bankruptcy code
while recoupment is not. Recoupment can take place outside the bankruptcy context. This does
not however change the treatment of such claims where there has been a discharge. The similarity
in treatment with respect to the discharge provisions of the bankruptcy code was recognized by
the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals. In the In re Davidovic case cited by Scott in his memorandum
in support of motion for summary judgment the 10th Circuit stated in footnote 4:
We also note but do not decide that a different result may obtain under either or both
doctrine when a creditor asserts a right to set-off or recoupment in a personal action
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brought by the debtor alone, rather than an action brought by the Bankruptcy Trustee to
recover assets for the bankruptcy estate. See Johnson v. Rutherford Hospital. (In re
Johnson). 13 B.R. 185, 188-189 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn 1981)(holding that 11 USC Section
524(a)(2) precludes set off of a discharged debt against a post petition judgment in favor
of the debtor, as opposed to the bankruptcy estate, under the Truth in Lending Act).
In re Davidovic at 1539n.4.
Simply seeking an alternative way to recover directly from and against the debtor post
petition is clearly precluded by the Bankruptcy Code. Section 524(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act 1978 provides in pertinent part that a discharge in a case under this title
"(2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action the
employment of process, or any act, to collect, recover, or off-set any such debt [discharged
under Section 727, 944, 1141, or 1348 of this title] as a personal liability of the debtor,
or from property of the debtor whether or not discharge of such debt is waived;
The language of this statute is clear. It prohibits the continuation of an action or any act to
collect any debt that is the personal liability of the debtor or from the property of the debtor With
the abandonment of property by the Trustee the property became the property of Ms. Majors.
While the Doctrine of Recoupment might have provided a separate means to attack the awarding
of the funds to the Bankruptcy Trustee in the bankruptcy estate, it does not provide any method
or means whereby additional claims can be made against Ms. Majors. The debts were discharged
and accordingly the Court's ruling that under the Doctrine of Recoupment Scott may obtain an offset against Ms. Majors is clear err.
V.

THE FEES, COSTS, AND DAMAGES AWARDED TO SCOTT ARE EXCESSIVE
AND/OR UNRECOVERABLE AND RESULT IN DOUBLE PAYMENT.
A.

The Attorneys Fees Requested are Not All Recoverable,

Even if the Court were to determine that in some fashion the claim for costs, fees or
damages had not discharged in the bankruptcy, in contravention to the discharge granted by the
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federal bankruptcy court for the State of California, and that Scott could continue his action in
order to attempt to garner those cost, fees and damages in the State of Utah. All the fees requested
are not recoverable in any event.
In Utah a claim for attorneys fees must be based on statute or contract. Without one of
those basis no recovery of attorneys fees is allowed. The stated basis of the requested attorneys
fees in this case is Paragraph 17 of the Real Estate Purchase Contract signed by Scott and Ms.
Majors.2 This provision states "17. ATTORNEYS FEES. Any action arising out of this Contract,
the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorneys fees." The affidavit that
attorneys fees for Hansen states on Paragraph 5. "To defend interest in Chapter 7 bankruptcy
proceedings I was required to hire a California bankruptcy Attorney, Michael J. Gilligan, of Reid
& Hellier of Riverside, California. Paragraph 6. I was required to pay Michael J. Gilligan
attorneys fees in the order of $2,000."
Clearly the fees paid in the bankruptcy proceedings are outside those fees specifically
awardable in this action. The charges set forth in the affidavit proper show that none of the time
charged on Page 352 of the record are recoverable under Paragraph 17 of the REPC. Neither is
any of the time on Page 353 of the record recoverable. None of these charges are directly related
to enforcing the contract. They are involved either with the bankruptcy proceedings of Ms. Majors
or the attempt to obtain damages and fees from Ms. Majors. Recovering attorneys fees and costs
is not an enforcement of the contract. The issue of enforcement of the contract had already been
decided and resolved at the time of the ruling of the Court of Appeals. Likewise all the fees and
2

Ms. Majors contention is that Scott never signed the agreement until after litigation was
commenced.
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costs awarded in the March 10, 1998 order are not recoverable. They deal with the separate action
brought by Scott to set aside the Lis Pendens filed from the California law suit.
Because these charges are not within the scope of attorneys fees provision in the contract
they are excessive and must be denied.
B.

Damages Sought by Scott Are Not Allowable.

Scott sought to establish additional damages by way of affidavit. The purported affidavit
is founded in the record on Pages 351-355. The affidavit itself is, however, improper and invalid
as it has no actual signature of the notary or of the Plaintiff. Therefore the affidavit itself is
nothing but hearsay and is completely invalid. An examination of the costs sought by Scott shows
them also to be nonrecoverable. If the judgment awarding Scott the property is upheld all that he
would be entitled to recover are his costs that he would not have had to expend to acquire the
property originally. If he would have had purchased the property clearly he would have had his
origination fee, his fee to the title company, and other costs. To be awarded both the property and
his costs is to receive double recovery. Likewise the receipt of property taxes for 1997 results in
double recovery. He cannot receive the rents without being responsible for the costs.
Furthermore, the costs that he is seeking, postage, miscellaneous long distance phone calls,
calls to Salt Lake to close the escrow, are completely unsupported by any document or any
legitimate affidavit.
The damages sought are improper and were discharged in any event by the bankruptcy
court. The Trial Court's order must accordingly be reversed.
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C.

Plaintiffs Request for Costs Are Not Allowable.

In the Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements (found at R. 528) Ms. Hansen identifies
all the requested costs as having been incurred after December 30, 1997.
The Utah Supreme Court has defined costs recoverable as "those fees which are required
to be paid to the Court and the witnesses, and for which the statutes authorize to be included in
the judgment." Frampton v. Wilson. 605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 1980). Overnight delivery charges
do not fall within that stricture; nor do certified copies, or Recorder's Fees.
At first blush the filing fees and service of process appear to be the types of costs
recoverable, but they are not fees in this case. Costs incurred in the California litigation can only
be recovered in California.
The Court's award of costs must therefore be reversed.
CONCLUSION
These matters are before the Court on the basis of the Trial Court's granting motions for
summary judgment with respect to attorneys fees and the transfer of ownership of the property at
issue. Material issues of fact exist with respect to the ownership issue. Taking the facts in the light
most favorable to Ms. Majors, the facts clearly result in Ms. Majors being allowed to keep her
property.
The Doctrines of Set Off or Recoupment are not a way to avoid the discharge provisions
of the bankruptcy code. They are applicable only against the estate of the bankrupt and accordingly
are only to be applied against the trustee. The actions of the Plaintiff and his counsel in this case
show clear disregard for the federal bankruptcy laws and the discharge provisions thereof. Because
the debts were discharged they cannot be pursued against Ms. Majors.
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Even if the materially disputed facts were ignored and the discharge provisions of the
federal bankruptcy code were ignored, the award of fees, costs and damages in this case are
improper. The fees, costs and damages awarded result in a windfall to the Plaintiff, are not
property supported by evidence, and/or are not recoverable under well established Utah law. Ms.
Majors therefore respectfully requests this Court overturn the decision of the Trial Court, remand
this matter for further proceedings with respect to the issue of Scott's breach of the REPC, after
the decision by the Court of Appeals, and with direction to the Trial Court that all fees, costs and
damages previously awarded are not recoverable in light of the arguments set forth above.
Respectfully Submitted.
DATED this £9^~day of July, 1998.
LARSON, KIRKHAM & TURNER

Shawn D. Turner
MAJORSAP.BRF

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this <*^ "day of July, 1998, I mailed, postage prepaid, a
copy of the foregoing Motion for Extension of Time to the following:
Mary Axvn Hansen.
852 N. 910 E.
PO Box 1994
Orem, UT 84059

K
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ADDENDUM A
COPIES OF ORDERS APPEALED FROM

MARY ANN HANSEN (5200)
Attorney for Plaintiff
854 NORTH 910 EAST
P.O. BOX 1994
OREM, UTAH 84059
Telephone:(801) 226-0300
Facsimile: (801) 764-0300
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STEVE SCOTT,

OftDEf
JUDGMENT ESTABLISHING
TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF
CONVEYANCE OF REAL PROPERTY

PLAINTIFF,
-vsLINDA MAJORS,

Civil No. 950300019CN

DEFENDANT.

Judge Pat B. Brian

BASED UPON this Court's Order, entered on or about January 29, 1996,
granting Plaintiff Summary Judgment of Specific Performance. Plaintiff is hereby awarded
judgment against Defendant as follows:
1.

Defendant shall convey to Plaintiff fee simple title to the following real

property located in Summit County, State of Utah:
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Unit 407, Carriage House Condominiums, a Utah Condominium
Project, together with an undivided 2/325ths ownership interest
in and to the common areas and facilities of the project as the
same are identified and established in the record of survey map
recorded August 10, 1988 as Entry No. 295097 and the
condominium declarations recorded August 10, 1988 as Entry No.
295098 in Book 489 at Page 15 of the official records in the office
of the Summit County Recorder.
2.

That pursuant to the Real Estate Purchase Contract ("REPC") the

Plaintiff is obligated to purchase the subject real property from the Defendant in the
amount of Thirty Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($37,500.00).

However, the

Plaintiff is allowed an offset against the purchase price the amount of Thirty Five Thousand
Five Hundred Sixty Three Dollars and Twenty Four Cents ($35,563.24), which is the total
sum of Plaintiffs attorney's fees, costs and damages in this matter. Therefore, Plaintiff
shall deliver to the Escrow Agent, in escrow, the total consideration for the subject property
in the amount of One Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty Six Dollars and Seventy Six Cents
($1,936.76).
3.

The closing of the conveyance (the "Closing") shall be held at the

offices of Associated Title Company, located at 1755 Prospector Avenue, Park City, Utah
(the" Escrow Agent"),
at such other place and time as shall be mutually agreed to, in writing, by the Plaintiff
and the Defendant. At Closing, the following shall occur, each of which shall be considered
a condition precedent to the other and ail of which shall be considered as taking place
simultaneously:
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a.

The Defendant shall execute and deliver to the Escrow Agent,

in escrow, a general warranty deed for the subject property.
b.

The Plaintiff shall deliver to the Escrow Agent, in escrow, the

consideration for the subject property as outlined above.
c.

The Plaintiff and Defendant shall execute and deliver to each

other such other documents (including without limitation closing statements) and take such
other actions as necessary and appropriate to effectuate the Closing in accordance
herewith and with the Real Estate Purchase Contract.
d.

That if Defendant fails to comply with any of the above-

referenced items necessary for Closing, then Associated Title Company shall be required
to execute all necessary documents including but not limited to closing statement and
general warranty deed. In the event that Associated Title is required to sign and or execute
any Closing documents, Rule 70 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that said
documents will have the same effect as if signed and executed by Defendant.

DATED this \^><D day of December, 1997.
BY THE COURT:

<ZL

uL.

Pit B. Brian
tSgtf r o O ^ #
Third District Court J u d g e ^ % ^
# ^
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Third District Court £ M
By.
Dtputy Clerk, Summit County

MARY ANN HANSEN (5200)
Attorney for Plaintiff
854 NORTH 910 EAST
P.O. BOX 1994
OREM, UTAH 84059
Telephone: (801) 226-0300
Facsimile: (801) 764-0300

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STEVE SCOTT,
JUDGMENT AND ORDER VESTING
TITLE OF REAL PROPERTY IN
PLAINTIFF

Plaintiff,

vs.

:

LINDA MAJORS,

Defendant.

Civil No. 950600019CN
Judge

Plaintiff's Motion for Order Vesting Title of Real Property in Plaintiff came before this
Court for hearing on Wednesday, February 18, 1998. Plaintiff was represented by Mary c
bu,+ w&* represented H townsol A (
Ann Hansen. Defendant was not present nor wtac cho roproocntod by counjol. Based
upon Plaintiffs Motion for Order Vesting Title of Real Property in Plaintiff, the Plaintiffs
supporting memoranda, the Affidavits of Steve Scott and Mary Ann Hansen, Memorandum
of Costs and Disbursements, and Affidavit of Attorney's Fees, the pleadings on file with the
Court, oral arguments of counsel, and for good cause appearing thereon;

Bfifei'7 r* 5&E n r . 1

n.Slfi

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.

Pursuant to Rule 70 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the court hereby

vests title to Plaintiff, Steve Scott, of real property located in Summit County, State of Utah
and more particularly described as follows:
Unit 407, Carriage House Condominiums, a Utah Condominium
Project, together with an undivided 2/325ths ownership interest
in and to the common areas and facilities of the project as the
same are identified and established in the record of survey map
recorded August 10,1988 as Entry No. 295097 and the
condominium declarations recorded August 10, 1988 as Entry No.
295098 in Book 489 at Page 15 of the official records in the office
of the Summit County Recorder.
("The Property").
2.

That any right, title or interest of the Defendant in the Property is

hereby extinguished.
*
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5.

The Summit County Court Clerk currently has in their possession funds

in the amount of $1,936.76. The Court Clerk is hereby ordered to disburse said funds in
the following manner

QfV&rr 7 v * .

a.

Pay 1997 Summit County real property taxes on the Property,

Serial Number CHC-407, in the amount of in the amount Six Hundred Fifty Three Dollars
and Ninety §ix Cents ($653.96).
±1

Pay PlaintilTa jlloinuy, Mdiy Ann I lanocn, Twelve I lundred

Fifty Tour Dullma ($1,254.00) fui miuiimy'b faeb diiU iub&.
c.

Pay Defendant Twenty Eight Dollars and Eighty Cents ($28.80)

which is the balance held by the Court Clerk.
DATED this

jh

day of February, 1998.
BY THE COURT:

William B. Bohling
|j£| J ^ i ?
Third District Court Judges = OQJ*?

I'
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Judgment and Order Vesting Title of Real Property in Plaintiff, postage prepaid, this
/o
day of February, 1998.
Linda Majors
P.O. Box 1418
Twin Peaks, CA 92391
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MARY ANN HANSEN (5200)
Attorney for Plaintiff
854 NORTH 910 EAST
P.O. BOX 1994
OREM, UTAH 84059
Telephone: (801) 226-0300
Facsimile: (801) 764-0300
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STEVE SCOTT,

0£D>£R.
ATTORNEY'S FEES JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
LINDA MAJORS,
Defendant.

Civil No. 950600019CN
Judge

Plaintiffs Motion for Order Vesting Title of Real Property in Plaintiff came before this
Court for hearing on Wednesday, February 18, 1998. Also, Plaintiffs Petition to Nullify
Defendant's Lien, Civil No. 980600027 came before this Court at the same time. Plaintiff
was represented by Mary Ann Hansen. Defendant was represented by Dana Facemyer
who made a limited appearance. The Court entered a Judgment and Order Vesting Title
of Real Property in Plaintiff in this matter and entered an Order Nullifying Lien in Civil No.
980600027.

The Court requested that Plaintiffs counsel prepare a supplemental order within ten
days as to attorney fees. Therefore, based upon Plaintiffs Affidavit as to Attorney's Fees,
and the pleadings on file with the Court, and for good cause appearing thereon;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.

That Plaintiff is awarded a judgment for attorney's fees and costs in

the amount of One Thousand Two Hundred and Fifty Four Dollars ($1,254.00).
2.

That the Summit County Court Clerk is ordered to disburse funds

escrowed in this matter to Plaintiffs attorney, Mary Ann Hansen, in the amount of Twelve
Hundred Fifty Four dollars ($1,254.00).
DATED this lb

day of " 7 K > ^ > U _
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ADDENDUM B
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
11 USC § 524 Effect of Discharge
(a) A discharge in a case under this title—
(2) operates as an injunction against the commencement of continuation of an action, the
employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a
personal liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived;
11 USC § 553. Setoff
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section and in sections 362 and 363 of this title, this
title does not affect any right of a creditor to offset a mutual debt owing by such creditor to the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title against a claim of such
creditor against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case, except to the
extent that(1) the claim of such creditor against the debtor is disallowed other than under section
502(b)(3) of this title;
(2) such claim was transferred, by and entity other than the debtor, to such creditor(A) after the commencement of the case; or
(B)(i) after 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; and
(ii) white the debtor was insolvent; or
(3) the debt owed to the debtor by such creditor was incurred by such creditor(A) after 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition;
(B) while the debtor was insolvent; and
(C) for the purpose of obtaining a right of setoff against the debtor.
(b)(1) Except with respect to a setoff of a kind described in section 362 (b)(6), 362(b)(B7),,
365(h)(2), or 365(i)(2) of this title, if a creditor offsets a mutual debt owing to the debtor
against a claim against the debtor on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the
petition, then the trustee may recover from such creditor the amount so offset to the extent that
any insufficiency on the date of such setoff is less than the insufficiency on the latter of~
(A) 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; and
(B) the first date during the 90 days immediately preceding the date of the filing
of the petition on which there is an insufficiency.
(2) In this subsection, "insufficiency" means amount, if any, by which a claim against the
debtor exceeds a mutual debt owing to the debtor by the holder of such claim.
(c) For the purposes of this section, the debtor is presumed to have been insolvent on and
during the 90 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition.
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*949 Judicial Administration Rule 4-501

WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES
UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION
PART I. JUDICIAL COUNCIL
RULES OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION
CHAPTER 4. OPERATION OF
THE COURTS
ARTICLE 5. CIVIL PRACTICE
Current with amendments received through
11-15-97
RULE 4-501. MOTIONS
Intent. To establish a uniform procedure for
filing motions, supporting memoranda and
documents with the court.
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting
and scheduling hearings on dispositive motions.
To establish
dispositions.

a

procedure

for

expedited

Applicability. This rule shall apply to motion
practice in all district courts except proceedings
before the court commissioners and small claims
cases. This rule does not apply to petitions for
habeas corpus or other forms of extraordinary
relief.
Statement of the Rule.
(1) Filing and
Memoranda.

Service of Motions and

Page 1
paragraph (2), except as waived by order of the
court on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte
application is made to file an over-length
memorandum, the application shall state the
length of the principal memorandum, and if the
memorandum is in excess of ten pages, the
application shall include a summary of the
memorandum, not to exceed five pages.
(b) Memorandum in Opposition to Motion.
The responding party shall file and serve upon
all parties within ten days after service of a
motion, a memorandum in opposition to the
motion, and all supporting documentation. If
the responding party fails to file a
memorandum in opposition to the motion
within ten days after service of the motion, the
moving party may notify the clerk to submit the
matter to the court for decision as provided in
paragraph (l)(d) of this rule.
(c) Reply Memorandum. The moving party
may serve and file a reply memorandum within
five days after service of the responding party's
memorandum.
*950 (d) Notice to Submit for Decision.
Upon the expiration of the five-day period to
file a reply memorandum, either party may
notify the Clerk to submit the matter to the
court for decision. The notification shall be in
the form of a separate written pleading and
captioned "Notice to Submit for Decision."
The notification shall contain a certificate of
mailing to all parties. If neither party files a
notice, the motion will not be submitted for
decision.
(2) Motions for Summary Judgment.

(a) Motion and Supporting Memoranda. All
motions, except uncontested or ex-parte
matters, shall be accompanied by a
memorandum of points and authorities,
appropriate affidavits, and copies of or citations
by page number to relevant portions of
depositions, exhibits or other documents relied
upon in support of the motion. Memoranda
supporting or opposing a motion shall not
exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the
"statement of material facts" as provided in

(a) Memorandum in Support of a Motion.
The points and authorities in support of a
motion for summary judgment shall begin with
a section that contains a concise statement of
material facts as to which movant contends no
genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated
in separate numbered sentences and shall
specifically refer to those portions of the record
upon which the movant relies.
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J ADMIN Rule 4-501, RULE 4-501. MOTIONS
(b) Memorandum in Opposition to a
Motion.
The points and authorities in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment
shall begin with a section that contains a
concise statement of material facts as to which
the party contends a genuine issue exists. Each
disputed fact shall be stated in separate
numbered sentences and shall specifically refer
to those portions of the record upon which the
opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall
state the numbered sentence or sentences of the
movant's facts that are disputed. All material
facts set forth in the movant's statement and
properly supported by an accurate reference to
the record shall be deemed admitted for the
purpose of summary judgment unless
specifically controverted by the opposing
party's statement.

requesting party that the matter shall be heard
and the requesting party shall schedule the
matter for hearing and notify all parties of the
date and time.
*951 (e) In those cases where a hearing is
granted, a courtesy copy of the motion,
memorandum of points and authorities and all
documents supporting or opposing the motion
shall be delivered to the judge hearing the
matter at least two working days before the date
set for hearing. Copies shall be clearly marked
as courtesy copies and indicate the date and
time of the hearing. Courtesy copies shall not
be filed with the clerk of the court.

(3) Hearings.

(f) If no written request for a hearing is
made at the time the parties file their principal
memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be
deemed waived.

(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered
without a hearing unless ordered by the Court,
or requested by the parties as provided in
paragraphs (3)(b) or (4) below.

(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at
least thirty (30) days before the scheduled trial
date. No dispositive motions shall be heard
after that date without leave of the Court.

(b) In cases where the granting of a motion
would dispose of the action or any issues in the
action on the merits with prejudice, either party
at the time of filing the principal memorandum
in support of or in opposition to a motion may
file a written request for a hearing.

(4) Expedited Dispositions. Upon motion and
notice and for good cause shown, the court may
grant a request for an expedited disposition in
any case where time is of the essence and
compliance with the provisions of this rule
would be impracticable or where the motion
does not raise significant legal issues and could
be resolved summarily.

(c) Such request shall be granted unless the
court finds that (a) the motion or opposition to
the motion is frivolous or (b) that the
dispositive issue or set of issues governing the
granting or denial of the motion has been
authoritatively decided.
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the
court shall notify the requesting party. When a
request for hearing is granted, the court shall
set the matter for hearing or notify the

(5) Telephone Conference. The court on its
own motion or at a party's request may direct
arguments of any motion by telephone
conference without court appearance.
A
verbatim record shall be made of all telephone
arguments and the rulings thereon if requested by
counsel.
[Amended effective November 1, 1996.]
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